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Abstract
Navigation satellites are a core component of navigation satellite based sys-
tems such as GPS, GLONASS and Galileo which provide location and timing
information for a variety of uses. Such satellites are designed for operating
on orbit to perform tasks and have lifetimes of 10 years or more. Relia-
bility, availability and maintainability (RAM) analysis of systems has been
indispensable in the design phase of satellites in order to achieve minimum
failures or to increase mean time between failures (MTBF ) and thus to plan
maintenance strategies, optimise reliability and maximise availability. In this
paper, we present formal models of both a single satellite and a navigation
satellite constellation and logical specification of their reliability, availability
and maintainability properties respectively. The probabilistic model checker
PRISM has been used to perform automated analysis of these quantitative
properties.
Keywords:
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probabilistic model checking
1. Introduction
With the emergence of efficient, high-performance, and low cost satel-
lites, earth orbiting satellites are often deployed in satellite constellations
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and space systems to ensure reliable and dependable missions. These kinds
of satellites have played an essential part in both civil and military contexts,
and support a wide range of applications ranging from satellite navigation
to space stations. Most of these applications are not only safety-critical but
also mission-critical, thus they heavily depend on such infrastructures within
the systems. A group of artificial satellites which work in concert is known
as a satellite constellation. A satellite constellation is a number of satellites
with coordinated ground coverage, operating together under shared control,
synchronised so that they overlap in coverage and complement rather than
interfere with other satellites coverage.
A navigation satellite system is a satellite constellation consisting of a
number of navigation satellites that provide autonomous geospatial position-
ing with global or regional coverage. It is by far one of the most successful
applications of satellites, and has been developed since 1973. A navigation
satellite system with global coverage is referred to as a global navigation
satellite system (GNSS). Leading international projects include the United
States’ Global Position System (GPS) and Russia’s Global Navigation Satel-
lite System (GLONASS), both of which are fully operational GNSSs. In
addition, China is expanding its regional Beidou navigation system into the
global compass navigation system, and the European Union’s Galileo posi-
tioning system is a GNSS in the initial deployment phase. Both of these
systems are planned to be fully operational in the next decade. Other coun-
tries such as India, France, and Japan are in the process of developing their
own regional navigation systems. See [1] for a good overview of navigation
satellite systems.
A satellite is designed to a functional requirement and it is important
that it satisfies this requirement. However it is also desirable that the satel-
lite should be predictably available and this depends upon its reliability and
availability. We aim to help the military or civil end users of the satellite
to assess the likelihood and consequences of fault or failure to their opera-
tions. Reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) analysis has been
indispensable in the design phase of navigation satellite systems in order to
achieve minimum failures or to increase mean time between failures (MTBF )
and thus to plan maintenance strategies, optimise reliability and maximise
availability. The question of how to select optimal configurations and main-
tenance plans and underlying resources, to satisfy requirements and improve
efficiency is a key research question. This concern calls for effective solutions
to the challenges of verifying large and complex navigation systems.
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Until now, attempts to verifying satellite based systems have been piece-
meal. Verification largely depends on brute force approaches, such as simula-
tion and testing. Simulation is the common testing and validation approach
used for the verification of satellite systems. Given a system, a finite subset of
the possible scenarios are selected in a specific simulation environment, and
then statistical analysis techniques are applied to obtain probabilistic results
for that system. However, simulation has been unable to keep up with the
growth in design complexity of satellite systems. On the other hand, formal
verification is a well-established technique in Computer Science for either
detecting errors, or for providing increased confidence in the reliability of
a system. It is therefore timely to apply formal verification techniques to
this domain. Formal verification can be applied to formally verify satellite
systems using automated tools including model checkers or theorem provers.
Model checking is a formal verification technique that involves defining
a model of a system from a formal specification. The model is then used to
check desired properties of the system. This involves exploring the underly-
ing state space of the model, and specifying properties via some formal logic
such as temporal logic. In this context, the effects of proposed changes to an
on orbit system can be first checked via a model, rather than via expensive
prototypes. The required reliability, availability, and maintainability prop-
erties of satellite systems can be expressed in temporal logic, and so lend
themselves very well to proof via model checking.
The goal of the paper is to adopt probabilistic model checking to cope
with the verification demand introduced by satellite systems. Probabilistic
model checking is a formal method for specifying quantitative properties of a
system model. Models obtained by this technique are normally extensions or
variants of Markov chains or automata, extended with costs and rewards that
estimate resources and their usage during operation. Properties to be veri-
fied or analysed are specified in temporal logic with auxiliary operators such
as probability and reward. We present an automated quantitative analysis
of reliability, availability, and maintainability of both a single satellite sys-
tem and a navigation satellite system, using the probabilistic model checker
PRISM [2].
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the underly-
ing navigation satellite systems. In Section 3 the use of formal methods is
introduced, while in Section 4 we give technical background on probabilistic
model checking. In Section 5 we present our formal specifications of a sin-
gle satellite and constellation systems and their associated continuous-time
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Markov chain models respectively. Then, we analyse reliability, availability,
and maintainability using the probabilistic model checker PRISM for a single
satellite and a satellite constellation in Sections 6. In Section 7 we report
related work for verifying satellite systems using model checking. Finally, in
Section 8 we conclude and outline directions for future research.
2. Satellite systems
As an important application of satellite constellation, navigation satellite
systems consist of three major segments: a space segment, a control segment,
and a user segment. The space segment is made up of a number of satellites,
and is responsible for sending the navigation signal on the specific frequency.
It is constantly orbiting the surface at an altitude of approximate three earth
radii, and emitting signals that travel at approximately the speed of light.
The control segment monitors the health and status of the space segment
and controls the state of satellites, and updates the data of those satellites.
The user segment consists of antennas and receiver processors, which receive
the signals broadcasted by the satellites and decode them to provide precise
information about the receivers position and velocity.
In a satellite constellation, fault or failure of more than one satellite will
have a direct impact on the stable state of the space geometry and temporal
relationship, and the performance of the constellation. So the performance
of the constellation is a direct consequence of the state of the constellation.
Therefore, the state of the constellation has a close relationship with the
state of every satellite in the constellation. So each satellite is critical to the
constellation.
In this paper, our task is to help the end users of satellite based systems
to evaluate the probability and consequences of faults or failures. The terms
of fault and failure in our context can be defined according to [3] as follows:
• Fault: the condition of a satellite that occurs when one of its compo-
nents or assemblies degrades or exhibits abnormal behaviour;
• Failure: the termination of the ability of a satellite to perform a re-
quired function.
Failure is an event as distinguished from fault, which is a state. According
to [3], the failure mode is the result by which a failure is observed. After a
failure, a satellite in the constellation will be systematically examined in order
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to identify the failure mode, and to determine the nature of the failure and
its basic cause. There are three kinds of failure mode of the satellite: long-
term failure (unrecoverable failure), short-term failure, and Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) failure. These failure modes are described as follows:
• Long-term failure: this failure is vital to the satellite. If a long-time
failure has happened, it usually needs to launch another satellite to
replace the failed one. Practically, it indicates that the failed satellite
is at the end of its life. It has also been called wear out failure;
• Short-term failure: this refers to a failure that can be repaired in several
hours or days. This kind of failure mode means that there is usually
no need to launch a new satellite to replace the failed satellite;
• O&M failure: is due to planned maintenance operations, such as navi-
gation satellite orbit manoeuvre and atomic clock switching. We usu-
ally do not consider the outage time that is induced by these operations
as a failure. It is not expected to impact the continuity of the constel-
lation, but the performance of the constellation.
Whenever a satellite has a fault or fails, there is a chance to repair the
satellite on orbit by, for example, rebooting the satellite system, updating
the satellite software, or switching the orbit of the satellite. There are three
satellite backup modes available for maintenance strategies: on orbit backup,
parking orbit backup, and Launch on Need (LON). The on orbit backup mode
and parking orbit backup mode are further referred to as space backup. In
this paper, we consider both space backup and LON backup. The main nav-
igation satellite system to be modelled and analysed is depicted in Figure 1.
Satellites deployed at the parking orbit backup mode can also be used to
work with on orbit satellites. For LON backup mode, it usually takes several
months to replace failed satellite, while for space backup mode it only takes
one or two days. Because of the lower mean time to repair (MTTR) for
the space backup mode, it has been widely applied in most constellation
projects. In the GPS project, the redundant satellites are working with on
orbit satellites, so failed satellites can be replaced in a short time.
3. Analysis techniques
In this paper, our models are Continuous-time Markov Chains (CTMCs),
and we verify our models using model checking. Before formally introducing
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this technique and discussing the role of formal verification, we briefly review
some traditional software and hardware verification and analysis techniques
that can be applied to analysing satellite based systems, which are led by
testing and simulation.
Testing is a dynamic verification technique that involves actually running
software systems. Testing takes the system under analysis and uses inputs
as tests. Correctness is thus verified by running the system to traverse a set
of execution paths. Based on the results during test execution, the actual
output of the system is compared to the system specification which is usually
in the form of documents.
Simulation is similar to testing, but is applied to system models which
represent the underlying system for analysis. Models are usually described
using hardware description languages. A simulator is used to examine ex-
ecution paths of the system model based on configuration inputs. These
inputs can be provided by a user, or by automated approaches such as using
a random generator. A mismatch between the simulator’s result and the
specification of the system exhibits the incorrect behaviours.
Both of these verification techniques are limited in that they only allow
exploration of a small subset of many possible scenarios. Formal methods is
the application of mathematical modelling and reasoning to prove that an
implementation coincides with precisely expressed notion of formal specifi-
cation. In this context, the purpose of formal analysis and verification is to
analyse the performance and to verify the correctness and properties of satel-
lite based systems in such a way that faults and failures can be identified.
Model checking and theorem proving are formal techniques that can be used
to detect faults and failures in a formal specification.
Although historically these forms of verification were used to prove cor-
rectness of explicit software and hardware designs, these days they are also
used for failure analysis. They are generally applied during the design phase,
where they are arguably most effective, for verifying correctness and other
essential properties. Model checking is an automated analysis technique that
requires expert knowledge to use. The user must provide an initial specifi-
cation of the system itself, as well as logical properties describing its desired
behaviour.
One strength of model checking to traditional analysis techniques is that
it is not sensitive to the probability that a fault or failure is exposed; this con-
trasts with testing and simulation that are aimed at tracing the most prob-
able faults or failures. Moreover, it allows one to precisely analyse results of
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checking desired properties. Model checking is a general analysis technique
that is applicable to a wide range of applications such as embedded systems,
software engineering, and hardware design. It also supports analysing prop-
erties individually, thus allowing one to focus essential properties first. This
enables incomplete formal models to be specified and verified.
The formal model of systems can be defined using a high-level formalism
or extracted directly form software using methods such as abstract interpre-
tation. Verification involves checking paths of the state transition graph (or
state-space) of the model. Traditionally this involves either exhaustive or
on-the-fly search of the state-space in which states are stored explicitly. An-
other method - symbolic model checking [4] - involves search of a symbolic
representation of the state space, in which groups of states and transitions
are explored in a single step.
Quantitative verification is a analysis technique for establishing quantita-
tive properties of a system model. Models analysed through this method are
typically variants of Markov chains, annotated with costs and rewards that
describe resources and their usage during execution. Properties are expressed
in temporal logic extended with probabilistic and reward operators. Quanti-
tative verification involves a combination of a traversal of the state transition
system of the model and numerical computation. In this paper, we employ
the power of probabilistic model checking, which is a leading quantitative
verification and analysis technique for a wide variety of systems.
4. Probabilistic model checking
In this section we introduce some formal notation that is relevant to
probabilistic model checking. Our definitions in Section 4.1 and 4.2 follow
[5], from which further details can be found.
4.1. Continuous-time Markov chains
Our approach is event based because of the fault and failure events that
can be sensed and monitored in the satellite systems. Rates are assigned
to events and our underlying semantics is continuous time Markov chains
(CTMCs): the state space is discrete but time is continuous. In this section,
we briefly review the basic concept of CTMCs.
Definition 1. Let AP be a fixed, finite set of atomic propositions. Formally,
a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) C is a tuple (S,sinit,R,L) where:
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• S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} is a finite set of states.
• sinit ∈ S is the initial state.
• R : S × S → R≥0 is the transition rate matrix.
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function which assigns to each state si ∈ S
the set L(si) of atomic propositions a ∈ AP that are valid in si.
Intuitively, R(si, sj) > 0 if and only if there is a transition from state si
to state sj. Furthermore, R(si, sj) specifies that the probability of moving
from si to sj within t time units is 1− e−R(si,sj)·t, an exponential distribution
with rate R(si, sj). If R(si, sj) > 0 for more than one state sj, a competition
between the transitions originating in si exists, known as the race condition.
The probability to move from a non-absorbing state si to a particular
state sj within t time units, i.e., the transition si → sj wins the race, is given
by:
P (si, sj, t) =
R(si, sj)
E(si)
· (1− e−E(Si)·t), (1)
where E(si) =
∑
sj∈S R(si, sj) denotes the total rate at which any transition
outgoing from state si is taken. More precisely, E(si) specifies that the
probability of taking a transition outgoing from the state si within t time
units is 1 − e−E(Si)·t, since the minimum of two exponentially distributed
random variables is an exponentially distributed random variable with rate
the sum of their rates. Consequently, the probability of moving from a non-
absorbing state si to sj by a single transition, denoted P (si, sj), is determined
by the probability that the delay of going from si to sj finishes before the
delays of other outgoing edges from si; formally, P (si, sj) = R(si, sj)/E(s).
For an absorbing state si, the total rate is E(si). In that case, we have
P (si, sj) = 0 for any state sj.
4.2. Continuous stochastic logic
The probabilistic model checker PRISM provides support for automated
analysis of a wide range of quantitative properties, such as “what is the prob-
ability of a failure causing the satellite to stop working within 12 hours?”,
“what is the worst-case probability of the satellite on-board system termi-
nating due to an error, over all possible initial configurations?”, or “what is
the worst-case expected time taken for the satellite signal to be received?”.
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In this paper, we use Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [6, 7] to specify
reliability, availability, and maintainability properties. CSL is inspired by the
logic Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [8], and its extensions to discrete time
stochastic systems (PCTL) [9], and continuous time non-stochastic systems
(TCTL) [10]. There are two types of formulae in CSL: state formulae, which
are true or false in a specific state, and path formulae, which are true or false
along a specific path.
Definition 2. Let a ∈ AP be an atomic proposition, p ∈ [0, 1] be a real
number, ./ ∈ {≤, <,>,≥} be a comparison operator, and I ⊆ R≥0 be a
non-empty interval. The syntax of CSL formulas over the set of atomic
propositions AP is defined inductively as follows:
• true is a state-formula.
• Each a ∈ AP is a state formula.
• If Φ and Ψ are state formulas, then so are ¬Φ and Φ ∧Ψ.
• If Φ is state formula, then so is S./p(Φ).
• If ϕ is a path formula, then P./p(ϕ).
• If Φ and Ψ are state formulas, then XIΦ and ΦUIΨ are path formulas.
Formula S./p(Φ) asserts that the steady-state probability for a state sat-
isfying Φ meets the bound ./ p. Similarly, formula P./p(ϕ) asserts that
the probability measure of the paths satisfying ϕ meets the bound given by
./ p. The operator P./p(.) replaces the usual CTL path quantifiers ∃ and
∀. Intuitively, ∃ϕ represents that there exists a path for which ϕ holds and
corresponds to P>0(ϕ), and ∀ϕ represents that for all paths ϕ holds and cor-
responds to P>1(ϕ). The temporal operator XI is the timed variant of the
standard next operator in CTL; the path formula XIΦ asserts that a transi-
tion is made to a Φ state at some time point t ∈ I. Operator UI is the timed
variant of the until operator of CTL; the path formula ΦUIΨ asserts that Ψ
is satisfied at some time instant in the interval I and that at all preceding
time instants Φ holds.
One of the most important operators is the P operator, which is used
to reason about the probability of an event. This operator was originally
proposed for use in the logic PCTL but also features in the other logics
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supported by PRISM, such as CSL. The P operator is applicable to all types
of models supported by PRISM.
It is often useful to compute the actual probability that some behaviour
of a model is observed. Therefore, PRISM allows a variation of the P
operator to be used in a query, i.e., P=?[pathprop], which returns a nu-
merical rather than a Boolean value (i.e., the probability that pathprop
is true). In our paper, we are interested in directly specifying reliability,
availability, and maintainability properties which evaluate to a numerical
value. For example, we might wish to calculate the probability that pro-
cess 1 terminates before process 2 does (say). This can be specified as
P=?[!proc2 terminate U proc1 terminate], where U is the “until” temporal
operator.
Another important operator we use is the R operator, which specifies
a cumulative reward property that associate a reward with each path of a
model, but only up to a given time bound. The property R=?[C <= t]
corresponds to the reward cumulated along a path until t time units have
elapsed. For CTMCs, the bound t can evaluate to a real value. Some typical
examples of properties using P and R operators can be found on the Property
Specification section of the PRISM website.
4.3. Reactive modules of PRISM
PRISM supports the analysis of several types of probabilistic models:
discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs),
Markov decision processes (MDPs), probabilistic automata (PAs), and also
probabilistic timed automata (PTAs), with optional extensions of costs and
rewards [2]. Moreover, PRISM allows us to verify properties specified in the
temporal logics PCTL for DTMCs and MDPs and CSL for CTMCs. Models
are described using the PRISM language, a simple, state-based language.
Markov models to be verified using specified in PRISM are specified us-
ing the PRISM modelling language which is based on the Reactive Modules
formalism [11]. A fundamental component of this language is a module. A
system is constructed as the parallel composition of a number of modules. A
module is specified as:
module name ... endmodule
A module definition consists of two parts: one containing variable dec-
larations, and the other commands. At any time, the state of a model is
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determined by the current value of all of the variables of all of the compo-
nents (modules). A variable declaration has the form:
x : [0..2] init 0;
In this example, variable x is declared, with range [0..2] and initial value
0. The behaviour of each module is specified using commands, comprising a
guard and one or more updates of the form:
[action] guard → rate : update
or,
[action] guard → rate1 : update1 + rate2 : update2 + ...
The (action) label is optional, and is used to force two or more modules
to synchronise. Updates in commands are labelled with positive-valued rates
[2] for CTMCs. The + indicates the usual non-deterministic choice. Within
a module, multiple transitions can be specified either as several different
updates in a command, or as multiple commands with overlapping guards.
The following examples:
[ ] x = 0 → 0.5 : (x′ = 0);
[ ] x = 0 → 0.8 : (x′ = 1);
and
[ ] x = 0→ 0.5 : (x′ = 0) + 0.8 : (x′ = 1);
are equivalent. The guard x = 0 indicates that command is only executed
when variable x has value 0. The updates (x′ = 0) and (x′ = 1) and their
associated rates indicate that the value of x will remain at 0 with rate 0.5 and
change to 1 with rate 0.8. In a CTMC, when multiple possible transitions are
available in a state, a race condition occurs [12]. The rate of the synchronised
transition is the product of all the individual rates.
5. Formal specification of satellite systems
In this section, we give an description of the basic formal models of both
a single satellite and a constellation of navigation satellites.
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5.1. A formal model of a single satellite
The abstract model of a single satellite is illustrated in Figure 2, param-
eters are omitted. We take a CTMC as our underlying PRISM model for our
abstract model.
We specify our CTMC model with states, a transition rate matrix, and
a labelling function. Initially, the satellite runs in the normal state. After
a period of execution it could be interrupted by an planned or unplanned
interruption. Planned interruptions are normally caused by certain types of
Operations and Maintenance (O&M), which could include manoeuvring the
station, atomic clock maintenance, software updates, and hardware main-
tenance. Unplanned interruptions can be caused by solar radiation, the
earth’s magnetic field cosmic rays, which result in a satellite Single Event
Upset (SEU). However, both planned and unplanned interruptions are usu-
ally temporary, lasting just several hours. An unplanned interruption usually
disappears automatically. The satellite can fail at any time during its lifetime
due to End-of-Life (EOL) outage or other vital failures.
When the satellite fails, staff on the ground must decide upon the best
approach to repair it. It may be possible that failures can be resolved on
orbit by giving specific software commands to the satellite. Otherwise it
might be necessary to move a redundant satellite into position to replace the
failed satellite. If no redundant satellite is available then a new satellite must
be manufactured and launched. In the worst case the new satellite does not
launch successfully due to a known probability of satellite launch failure.
Most of our parameter values correspond to those of the latest United
States’ GPS system, GPS Block III satellites. The GPS III series is the
newest block of GPS satellites. GPS III provides more powerful signals than
previous versions in addition to enhanced signal reliability, accuracy, and
integrity. The key improvement is the 15 years’ design lifespan [13]. Due
to privacy and secrecy reasons, NASA does not release all actual data of
GPS III that we need in our analysis. Thus, in order to perform the analysis
convincingly, we use some generic data of some very similar satellites instead.
We believe this this will not result in a loss of generality since all data come
from real satellites.
All parameters used in our CTMC model and properties are specified in
Table 1, and are described as follows. We use p to express probability and t
for time, and the reliability of the satellite is r. If the satellite fails, we say
that it moves from a “normal” state to a “failure” state. The mean time to
unplanned interruption is tu, while the mean time to planned interruption
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is tp. When the satellite fails, the probability of the failure being resolved
on orbit by moving a redundant satellite to replace the failed one is pb. If
on orbit repair is not possible, a new satellite is needed. The time taken
to decide to build a new satellite and for one to be manufactured are tr
and td respectively. If a new satellite is to be manufactured, the probability
of successful launch is py. After successful launch, the time taken for the
satellite to move to the right position and a normal signal sent from it to be
received on the ground is tk. Our PRISM specification is given in Figure 3.
Specifically, in Figure 3 tj is the time from launching the satellite to
moving it to the right orbit when the satellite has been successfully carried
to the orbit if there are no spare satellites on the ground, and ts is the time
from launching the satellite to moving it to the right orbit when the satellite
has not been carried to the right orbit if there are no spare satellites on the
ground, and tk the time from launching the satellite to moving it to the right
orbit when the satellite has been successfully carried to the orbit if spare
satellites is available on the ground, and tm is the time from launching the
satellite to moving it to the right orbit when the satellite has not been carried
to the right orbit if spare satellites is available on the ground.
5.2. A formal model of a constellation of navigation satellites
We have modelled a single satellite as a CTMC, by specifying it in PRISM.
However, the RAM analysis of a single satellite appears insufficient for larger
navigation satellite systems. For a large global navigation system, at least
24 satellites are required. Even for a regional navigation system, at least 4
satellites are required. Our PRISM model for a satellite constellation is thus
constructed using our specification for a single satellite, with a number of
modifications as follows:
• the number of satellites is declared as a global variable, and multiple
satellite modules are instantiated;
• the configuration of the satellite constellation is defined;
• redundant satellites that are usually called spare satellites are included.
Note that the last modification above is due to the fact that, in a real
system, if an on orbit satellite fails, redundant on orbit satellites are used to
move and replace them, to ensure the availability of the constellation.
13
The reference model of the satellite constellation is depicted in Figure 4.
The constellation has n satellites on orbit, and m spare satellites. If the on
orbit satellites do not fail, the state of the constellation keeps n satellites
available. Once an on orbit satellite fails, one of the spare satellites will
replace it immediately to keep n in working condition. If any on orbit satellite
fails and there is no spare satellite available to replace it, the number of
satellites in the constellation will be reduced to a number smaller than n.
Thus, spare satellites play a crucial effect on the availability of the satellite
constellation.
In the reference model, if the number of satellites in the constellation is
n and the number of spare satellites is m, where m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1, the
launch on schedule (LOS) strategy is to not launch a new satellite. At any
time at most one satellite can be repaired. If any on orbit satellite fails, it
is immediately replaced by a spare satellite, and repair of the failed satellite
commences. If there are no spare satellites, the constellation must operate
with fewer than n satellites.
Since the focus of our research is to apply the probabilistic model check-
ing approach and to study its applicability to a satellite constellation, the
object of our paper is not limited to any specific navigation satellite system.
The system we study here follows a standard configuration for global navi-
gation system. Due to the fact that the current United States’ GPS is the
most widely used navigation system, parameter values of the constellation
also refer to the latest basic parameter settings of such constellation. The
parameter values are shown in Table 2.
Our PRISM specification is given in Figure 5. Assume that the failure and
repair rates of a satellite are λ and µ respectively. When the constellation is
operating with n usable satellites, the state transfer rate of the constellation
is nλ. When there are no spare satellites and satellites begin to fail, the
transfer rate reduces accordingly to nλ, where λ is the number of functioning
satellites.
6. Quantitative properties and automated analysis
6.1. Desired properties
We have identified the need to analyse reliability, availability, and main-
tainability properties of navigation satellite systems. In the GPS standard
proposed in [14], there are two definitions of availability. The first one is the
probability that the slots in the constellation will be occupied by a satellite
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transmitting a trackable and healthy Standard Positioning Service (SPS) Sig-
nal in Space (SIS). The second definition is the percentage of time that the
SPS SIS is available to a SPS receiver. According to the same standard, there
are two kinds of availability of satellites. The first is the per-slot availability,
and the second is the constellation availability, which can be described as
follows,
• Per-slot availability: The time that a slot in the constellation will be
occupied by a satellite that is transmitting a trackable and healthy SPS
SIS;
• Constellation availability: the time that a specified number of slots
in the constellation are occupied by satellites that are transmitting a
trackable and healthy SPS SIS.
In our research, we do not consider the environmental effect of the signal
for the availability analysis. We only consider fault or failure of satellites. In
our context, availability means the ratio of running time for normal satellites
to total running time for both normal and failed satellites. The availabilities
that we have analysed are: single satellite availability and satellite constella-
tion availability.
The reliability of a satellite depends on planned interruptions, unplanned
interruptions, and failure states in the system. The probability of successful
launch is the reliability of the satellite, and the maintainability of the satellite
is the probability that a satellite can be repaired on orbit. Generally, both
reliability and maintainability can be considered as availability properties of
the satellite. Reliability must be sufficient to support the mission capability
needed in its expected operating environment.
If reliability and maintainability are not adequately designed into satellite
systems, there is risk that the design will breach desired availability require-
ments. Therefore, such system availability baseline is determined by the
threshold of design or development costs, which is significantly higher due to
resulting corrective action costs. This will cost more than anticipated to use
and operate, or will fail to provide the expected availability.
Satellites will deteriorate with time due to failure mechanisms. We as-
sume that time delay is a random variable selected from an exponential
distribution, which is an assumption used in PRISM. According to system
reliability theory [15], the reliability of a satellite R(t) can be defined as:
R(t) = Pr{T > t} = e−λt, (2)
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from which we obtain:
λ(t) =
−lnR(t)
E(si)
. (3)
Satellite failures typically occur at some constant failure rate λ, and fail-
ure probability depends on the rate λ and the exposure time t. According to
[3], typically failure rates are carefully derived from substantiated historical
data such as mean time between failure (MTBF ). We have:
λ =
−lnR
T
=⇒ λ = −lnR
MTBF
, (4)
where t = T = MTBF , and MTBF is the design parameter or the statistics
parameter. Referring to the latest characteristics of satellites used for Global
Positioning Systems (GPSs), we assume the MTBF of the satellite to be 15
years. As a result, R = 0.80 and MTBF = 15 years. Further, the mean
time to repair (MTTR) is 24 hours.
µ =
1
MTTR
. (5)
For the evaluation of the availability of the constellation, we focus on long-
term failure effects to the constellation. The long term reflect the lifetime of
the satellite, and can be described by the MTBF and MTTR. The MTBF
is used to get the parameter failure rate λ according to the Equation 4. The
MTTR is used to calculate the parameter repair rate µ according to the
Equation 5.
6.2. Formal analysis of a single satellite
In this section we describe the parameters used in our model and their
values. We then use the PRISM probabilistic model checker to analyse some
important properties of the single satellite system. The properties include
reliability, maintainability, and availability. The temporal logic CSL is used
to analyse the navigation systems because PRISM supports the use of CSL
to verify properties of a CTMC. We then present and analyse our model
checking results.
6.2.1. Reliability properties and results
Reliability properties of a single satellite that we can analyse using PRISM
include:
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1. when r = 0.80, the probability that a satellite will need to be replaced
by a new one in 15 years:
P=?[F <= T s = 5]; T = 129600
2. when r = 0.80, the probability that a satellite will need to be replaced
by a new one due to complete failure in 15 years over time T:
P=?[F <= T s = 5]; r = 0.80; T = 0 : 129600 : 8640
3. when r = 0.80, how many times a satellite will need to be replaced by
a new one in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.80
The reward expression in the PRISM model is the following:
rewards ′′num replace′′
[g] true : 1;
[e] true : 1;
endrewards
4. how many times a satellite will need to be replaced by a new one over
different reliabilities, in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.05
The reward expression is the same as that for reliability property 3.
In the properties above (and in all other contexts henceforth), 129600 is
the lifetime of a satellite in hours (evaluating to approximately 15 years).
Parameter r denotes reliability and proposition s = 5 asserts that there is a
spare satellite on the ground. The expression r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.05 indicates
that the reliability ranges from 0.01 to 0.99 with interval size 0.05.
The analysis results of reliability properties which we obtain from PRISM
are as follows. The result of the property 1 is 0.0771; the result of property
2 is shown in Figure 6(a); the result of property 3 is 0.08; the result of
property 4 is shown in Figure 6(b). From Figure 6(b), we can see that the
number of times the satellite will have a failure and be unable to be repaired
in 15 years is 0.08, under the precondition that the reliability is 0.80. If
the reliability is set to 0.5, the number of vital failures will be smaller than
0.25 during 15 years. The number of times of unplanned interruptions can
be also obtained from the PRISM by checking the rewards of the unplanned
interruption, which is 29.95 times unplanned interruption for the satellite in
15 years.
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6.2.2. Maintainability properties and results
Maintainability properties of a single satellite that we can analyse using
PRISM include:
1. when r = 0.80, the number of times that satellites need to be repaired
on orbit in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.80
The reward expression in PRISM model is the following:
rewards ′′num repair′′
[d] true : 1;
endrewards
2. the number of times that the satellite needs maintenance when the
reliability is from 0.01 to 0.99 in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.01
3. the number of cases that a satellite needs to be repaired when the
MTBF is from 1st year to 15th years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.01;MTBF = 1 :
129600 : 8640
The reward expression is the same as that for maintainability property
1.
4. when r = 0.80, the number of cases that a satellite needs to be repaired
on orbit, but not eventually succeed in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.80
The reward expression is the same as that for maintainability property
1.
The analysis results of maintainability properties which we obtain from
PRISM are as follows. The result of the property 1 is 0.18; the result of
property 2 is shown in Figure 7(a); the result of the property 3 is shown
in Figure 7(b); the result of property 4 is 0.036. The number of times the
satellite needs to be repaired on orbit over time is shown in Figure 7(a).
When the reliability of the satellite is increased to 0.5, the number of times
the satellite needs to be repaired will decrease to 0.5. Figure 7(b) illustrates
that the number of times that the satellite needs to be repaired is below 1
when the MTBF is 2 years.
6.2.3. Availability properties and results
Availability properties of a single satellite that we can analyse using
PRISM includes:
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1. when r = 0.80, the availability of the satellite in 15 years:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; T = 129600; r = 0.80
The reward expression in PRISM model is as the following:
rewards ′′availability′′
s = 0 : 1;
endrewards
2. the availability of a satellite over the satellite reliability in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.01
The reward expression is the same as that for availability property 1.
3. the relationship between satellite availability and its maintenance time
taken for planned interruption:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; T = 129600; r = 0.80, o = 1 : 48 : 3
The reward expression is the same as that for availability property 1.
The analysis results of availability properties which we obtain from PRISM
are as follows. The result of property 1 is 129378 hours; the result of property
2 is shown in Figure 8(a); the result of property 3 is shown in Figure 8(b).
From Figure 8(a) we see that if the reliability increases to 0.4, the availability
of the satellite reaches 0.995. So if the required probability of the available
satellite is 0.995, the reliability must have minimum value 0.4. Figure 8(b)
indicates that if the required availability is 0.995, the time taken for planned
interruption for the satellite will be smaller than 16 hours.
6.3. Formal analysis of a constellation of navigation satellites
In this section, we analyse the properties of the satellite system that is
made up of a constellation of navigation satellites. Similar to the case of the
single satellite, we use PRISM to check the reliability, maintainability, and
availability of the navigation system. We first present properties and their
corresponding CSL, and then present and analyse the results of verifying
these properties.
6.3.1. Reliability properties and results
Reliability properties of the navigation satellite system that we can anal-
yse using PRISM include:
1. when the reliability is 0.80, the probability that the number of the
useable satellites in the constellation is smaller than 24 in 15 years:
P=?[F <= T (s = 4)]; T = 129600
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2. when the reliability is 0.80, the probability that the number of the
useable satellites in the constellation is smaller than 22 in 15 years:
P=?[F <= T (s = 6)]; T = 129600
3. the number of times that all redundant satellites fail in 15 years over
the reliability and time:
R=?[C <= T ]
The reward expression in PRISM model is the following:
rewards ′′num fail′′
[a2] true : 1;
endrewards
The proposition s = n states that n satellites in the constellation fail.
The analysis results of reliability properties which we obtain from PRISM are
as follows. The result of property 1 is 0.01171; the result of property 2 is
0.0796; the result of property 3 is shown in Figure 9.
From Figure 9(a), when the reliability is between 0 and 0.25, the number
of times that all redundant satellites need to be repaired is proportional
to the reliability. As the reliability increases so does the number of required
repairs, until the number of repairs reaches 4.76. However when the reliability
is between 0.25 and 1, the number of times that all redundant satellite need
to be repaired is inversely proportional to reliability. This is due to the
fact that when the reliability decreases to below a specific value, redundant
satellites can no longer be repaired. According to Figure 9(b), the number
of times that all redundant satellites need to be repaired is between 0 and
0.095 in 15 years.
6.3.2. Maintainability properties and results
Maintainability properties of the navigation satellite system that we can
analyse using PRISM include:
1. the average number of times to repair all satellites in the constellation
in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]
The reward expression in PRISM model is shown as the following:
rewards ′′num repair′′
[bi] true : 1;
for all i, 1 <= i <= 27
endrewards
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2. The number of times to repair all satellites in the constellation over the
reliability in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.05
The reward expression in PRISM model is the same as that for main-
tainability property 1.
3. The probability of the case that the number of useable satellites in the
constellation is smaller than 22 in 15 years over the number of times
for repairing satellites:
P=?[F <= T (s = 6)]; T = 129600; MTTR = 0.1 : 3600 : 72
The analysis results of maintainability properties which we obtain from
PRISM are as follows. The result of property 1 is 5.18; the result of property
2 is shown in Figure 10(a) and the result of the property 3 is shown in
Figure 10(b).
From Figure 10(a) we see that as reliability increases, the number of
times that all satellites in the constellation need to be repaired over 15 years
decreases from 35 to 2.5 when the reliability reaches 0.90. As depicted in
Figure 10(b), the probability that the constellation consists of n satellites
with n is smaller than 22 in 15 years is 0.0225.
6.3.3. Availability properties and results
Availability properties of the navigation satellite system that we can anal-
yse using PRISM include:
1. the period of time that the constellation consists of 24 satellites in 15
years:
R=?[C <= T ];,
and reward expression in the PRISM model is shown as below:
rewards ′′reward′′
s = i : 1; where 0 <= i <= 3
endrewards
2. the availability of the constellation consists of 24 satellites in 15 years:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ;,
and reward expression is the same as the availability property 1;
3. the availability of the constellation consists of 24 satellites in 15 years
over the reliability:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.05,
and reward expression is the same as the availability property 1;
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4. the availability of the constellation consists of 24 satellites in 15 years
over the repair time:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; MTTR = 0.1 : 3600 : 72
and reward expression is the same as the availability property 1.
The analysis results of availability properties which we obtain from PRISM
are as follows. The result of property 1 is 129545 hours; the result of property
2 is 0.99958; the results of properties 3 and 4 are shown in Figures 11(a) and
11(b) respectively.
The availability of the satellite constellation as the reliability and time
taken to repair satellites increases is shown in Figures 11(a) and 11(b) re-
spectively. According to Figure 11(a), if the availability of the constellation
is 0.9999 and the time taken to repair a satellite is 5 months, the reliabil-
ity is at least 0.86. When the reliability is 0.80 , for the same availability
requirement of the constellation, when the satellite has a fault or fails, the
time taken to repair a satellite is at most 2520 hours (3.5 months).
6.4. Discussion of results
Since parameter settings of our formal models are based on GPS Block
III which is the newest generation of GPS systems, our analysis results can
be compared to existing GPS statistical analysis. According to a report
of Lockheed Martin [16], a leading global security and aerospace company,
the availability of the GPS Block III is given as 99.9%. The availability we
evaluate in this paper is close to the actual data. According to a further
Lockheed Martin report [17], the constellation availability of the GPS Block
III is given as 99.88%.
In this paper, the availability we evaluate for two scenarios is in each case
close to the actual data. This has proved to be both useful and efficient to
use probabilistic model checking approach for the modelling and analysis of
a singe satellite and a constellation of navigation satellites. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to use the formal technique of probabilistic
model checking to perform RAM analysis of satellite systems. These results
indicates that our approach can also be applied to a wider range of quanti-
tative properties of formal models taken from many application domains for
satellite systems.
6.5. Benefits of the approach
To address the performance of satellite systems, it is essential to accu-
rately quantify aspects such as reliability, availability and maintainability.
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There are two common techniques can be used for evaluating these features.
One is the reliability block, and the other is the fault tree. However, neither
technique is suitable to evaluate probabilistic properties, due to the fact that
they are static techniques. In a fault tree or reliability block formalism, it is
necessary to assume the probabilities of each fault or failure are independent,
while this is not the case in reality.
Other benefits of applying probabilistic model checking with PRISM for
the specification and analysis of satellite systems is that the results can be
plotted as graphs that can be inspected for trends and anomalies. Further-
more, we are able to compute exact quantities, rather than approximations
based on a large number of simulations, thus enabling us to obtain complete
and exhaustive conclusions for all possible parameter values. In addition,
PRISM enables automated analysis. This helps manual analysis with auto-
matic analysis support, thus making development more efficient and min-
imising human errors during the design phase.
There are also some disadvantages to using Markov models, not least that
their specification, and the specification of useful properties, requires a high
degree of mathematical skill. Markov models may be large and cumbersome
in some cases, and the specification can be error-prone. In addition, as a
system increases in complexity, so does the size of the state-space associated
with a corresponding model. This results in a longer (possibly intractable)
search.
7. Related work
There have been a number of notable attempts to use formal methods
to address the problems of design exploration for a satellite system. The
theorem prover PVS [18] was used to verify desired properties in system
models of Ariane 5 where the cost of failure is high. The PICGAL project
[19] analysed ground-based software for launch vehicles similar to Ariane
5. In a NASA report [20], formal methods and their application to critical
systems are explained to stakeholders from the aerospace domain. In [21]
Markov models are used to evaluate the cost of availability of coverage of
satellite constellation. The potential role of formal methods in the analysis
of software failures in space missions is discussed in [22], .
Similarly, [23] explores how verification techniques, such as static analysis,
model checking, and compositional verification, can be used to gain trust
in space-based systems. Model checking has proved to be a suitable formal
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technique for exposing errors in satellites, mainly due to classical concurrency
errors. Unforeseen interleaving between processes may cause undesired events
to occur. In [24], the SPIN model checker [25] was used to formally analyse
a multi-threaded plan execution module, which is a component of NASA’s
artificial intelligence-based spacecraft control system as a part of the Deep
Space 1 mission. Five previously undiscovered errors were identified in the
spacecraft controller, in one case representing a major design flaw.
The model checker Murψ [26] has been used in [27] to model the Entry,
Descent and Landing phase of the Mars Polar Lander. It was then used to
search for sequences of states that led to the violation of a Murψ invariant.
This stated that the thrust of the pulse-width modulation, which controls
the thrust of the descent engines, should always be above a certain altitude.
In [28] the model checker NuSMV [29] is used to model and verify the imple-
mentation of a mission and safety critical embedded satellite software control
system. The control system is responsible for maintaining the altitude of the
satellite and for performing fault detection, isolation, and recovery decisions,
at a detailed level.
Furthermore, model checking is used in [30] to simulate satellite opera-
tional procedures, and it exploits a simulator of a satellite as a black box
in order to formally verify operational procedures. In [30, 31], exhaustive
search of all possible simulation scenarios is performed, using the simulator
as a model. Thus the verification is automated and complete. Moreover, the
approach of system level formal verification to exploit a simulator in order
to carry out formal verification has been further developed in [32, 33] and
applied to biological contexts. Finally, all these approaches use the explicit
model checker CMurphi [34].
Our preliminary research into the verification of satellite systems, in which
we restrict our analysis to a single satellite, is presented in [35]. In work [36]
similar to ours, formal techniques have been used on a regular design of a
modern satellite. In that work the COMPASS automated tool is used to
carry out their analysis. COMPASS [37] supports model checking techniques
for verifying correctness, using fault trees for safety analysis. The major
difference between this work and ours is that we perform formal analysis of
quantitative properties such as reliability, availability, and maintainability of
both a single satellite and a constellation of satellites. Whereas, [36] mainly
verifies qualitative properties (such as correctness, safety, and dependability)
of a single satellite.
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8. Conclusions and future work
Reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) analysis of systems
has been indispensable in the design phase of satellites in order to achieve
minimum failures or to increase mean time between failures (MTBF ) and
thus to plan maintainability strategies, optimise reliability and maximise
availability. Traditional approaches are not suitable for performing RAM
analysis of navigation satellite systems. We present formal models of both a
single satellite system and a constellation of navigation satellites and logical
specification of reliability, availability and maintainability properties. We
have analysed a set of properties using the automatic probabilistic model
checker PRISM.
There are many technical and theoretical challenges that remain to be
addressed. In particular, satellite failure often forms part of more complex
problems that show through different aspects of the engineering of space
based systems. The technical challenges also include basic issues with the
representation of safety and space mission critical characteristics of satellite
telecommunications due to a group of satellites working together given the
limitations of classical modelling approach.
In order to fully explore satellite behaviour, it will be necessary to exploit
further formal techniques. For instance, if we want to model the mobility of
connection between satellites it may be necessary to express behaviour via
an extension to the pi-calculus, and model check using PRISM (a technique
identified in [38]). This kind of issue must be addressed in order to iden-
tify the causes of satellite system failure and to support the development of
satellite systems.
As PRISM assumes events to occur according to an exponential distribu-
tion, we are limited to making the same assumption about the events in our
systems. In fact, many types of satellite failure follow a different distribution.
In particular, a number of failures of satellites have a Weibull distribution
[39], which follows the conventional three-component bathtub curve which
models a burn-in and wear-out phase for failure prediction. For future work,
we will look at how to represent arbitrary distributions in probabilistic mod-
els, and to what extent such kind of distributions are able to be supported
by the probabilistic model checking approach.
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Tables
r MTBF MTTR tu tp pb tr td te py tk
years hours hours hours hours hours hours hours
0.80 15 24 4320 4320 0.80 24 1440 4320 0.90 24
Table 1: Parameters used in the model for the single satellite system .
r MTBF (T ) MTTR n m
0.80 15 years 5 months 24 3
Table 2: Parameters for the navigation satellite systems.
31
Figures
Have fault
or failure
Configure satellites
Satellite
constellation
Repair
on orbit
Replace
on ground
Network
Failed satellite
Repair by placing spare
satellite on orbit
Launch a new satellite
Start
working
Return
normal
Satellite navigation systems
Repair by sending commands
Satellites
EarthGround control
Figure 1: An overview of navigation satellite systems.
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Figure 2: A reference model of a single satellite.
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ctmc
const double r; //reliability of satellite
const double MTBF;
const double life = MTBF*12*30*24; //life time of the satellite
const double tu = 180*24; //mean time between the unplanned interruption
const double tp = 180*24; //mean time between the planed interruption
const double lan = -life/log(r,2.71828183); //failure rate of the satellite
const double d = 1;
const double e = 1;
const double MTTR = 24; //meant time to repair
const double tr = 24; //time to decide to build a new satellite
const double td = 2*30*24; //time to launch if it is available
const double te = 6*30*24; //time to launch if it is unavailable
const double tj = 24; //time from launching to moving it to the right orbit if successful & no spares on ground
const double ts = 24; //time from launching to moving it to the right orbit if not successful & no spares on ground
const double tk = 24; //time from launching to moving it to the right orbit if successful & a spare is available on ground
const double tm = 24; //time from launching to moving it to the right orbit if not successful & a spare is available on ground
const double tn = 2; //time of the unplanned interruption 
const double to = 2; //time of the planned interruption
const double a2 = 1;
const double Pb = a2*4; //probability of the failure can be eliminated on orbit
const double a3 = 1;
const double Py = a3*9; //probability of the satellite can be successfully carried to the orbit
module satellite
s : [0..15];
[a]  s=0  -> 1/tu   : (s'=1);
[b]  s=0  -> 1/tp   : (s'=2);
[c]  s=0  -> 1/lan  : (s'=3);
[d1] s=3  -> 1/a2   : (s'=8);
[d2] s=3  -> 1/Pb   : (s'=9);
[d]  s=8  -> 1/d    : (s'=4);
[e]  s=9  -> 1/e    : (s'=5);
[f1] s=4  -> 1/a2   : (s'=10);
[g1] s=4  -> 1/Pb   : (s'=11);
[f]  s=10 -> 1/MTTR : (s'=0);
[g]  s=11 -> 1/tr   : (s'=5);
[h]  s=5  -> 1/td   : (s'=6);
[i]  s=5  -> 1/te    : (s'=7);
[j1] s=6  -> 1/a3   : (s'=12);
[k1] s=6  -> 1/Py   : (s'=13);
[j]  s=12 -> 1/tj    : (s'=0);
[k]  s=13 -> 1/ts    : (s'=5);
[l1] s=7  -> 1/a3   : (s'=14);
[m1] s=7  -> 1/Py   : (s'=15);
[l]  s=14 -> 1/tk    : (s'=0);
[m]  s=15 -> 1/tm    : (s'=5);
[n]  s=1  -> 1/tn    : (s'=0);
[o]  s=2  -> 1/to    : (s'=0);
endmodule
Figure 3: PRISM module for a single satellite.
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Figure 4: A reference model of a constellation of navigation satellites.
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ctmc
const double r; //reliability of satellite system
const double MTBF;
const double life = MTBF*12*30*24; //life time of the satellite
const double lan = -life/log(r,2.71828183); //failure rate of the satellite
const double m = 3; //the number of the spare satellites  
const double n = 24; //the number of the on orbit satellites
const double a = lan/n;
const double ai = lan/(n-(i-3)); //where 4<=i<=27
const double MTTR; //the mean time to repair
module constellation
s:[0..27];
[ai1] s=i -> 1/a: (s’=i+1); //where 0<=i<=3
[ai2] s=i -> 1/ai: (s’=i+1); //where 4<=i<=26
[bi]  s=i -> /MTTR:(s'=i-1); //where 1<=i<=27
endmodule
Figure 5: PRISM module for the satellite constellation.
(a) Reliability property 2 (b) Reliability property 4
Figure 6: Analysis results of reliability properties of a single satellite.
(a) Maintainability property 2 (b) Maintainability property 3
Figure 7: Analysis results of maintainability properties of a single satellite.
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Figure 8: Analysis results of availability properties of a single satellite.
(a) Reliability property 3: part 1 (b) Reliability property 3: part 2
Figure 9: Analysis results of reliability properties of the satellite constellation.
(a) Maintainability property 2 (b) Maintainability property 3
Figure 10: Analysis results of maintainability properties of the satellite constellation.
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Figure 11: Analysis results of availability properties of the satellite constellation.
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